T h e overwhelming majority of the points made in this assessment of the first draft of the U.S. bishops' pastoral, "Catholic Social 'Teaching and the U.S. Economy,"' shall be critical; indeed, highly critical. It therefore behooves us to begin by considering the positive elements of the bishops' pastoral, before examining its shortcomings.
I. POSITIVE ELEMENTS

A. Moral Courage
High on any possible listing of the praiseworthy aspects of the bishops' pastoral is surely the moral courage it took to contemplate this project, research the issues, and publish the first draft. Moral courage, moreover, pervades every nook and cranny of this document. T h e bishops have a point of view, a strong one, and they do not hesitate to deliver their message in a forthright and even forceful manner.* T h e bishops had anticipated that this pastoral letter would unleash a torrent of abuse;s this expectation was not disappointed. But even they may not have realized the level of vilification that their missive would call forth. A survey of 10. 1 I .
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127 its agencies to try to prevent the organization of unions . . . ..'la And according to Archbishop Weakland, the chairman of the committee which prepared the pastoral, "the letter 'will not be credible' without an examination of the church's role in the economy including its relationships with It is perfectly true that people will tend t o disbelieve the bishops' pastoral unless the Church's acts begin to conform with its teachings. However, there is a far more basic refutation of the charge of hypocrisy available to the bishops-showing that all such complaints are merely variants of the ad hominum argument, an informal fallacy in logic.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the bishops were indeed hypocritical, saying one thing and doing another. Even so, this is all beside the point. O u r task here is to evaluate the truth of the bishops' pastoral, and the economic activities of the bishops are entirely irrelevant to the veracity of their letter. Einstein's theories were correct, even though he might not have been able to balance his checkbook. Similarly, the correctness of the bishops' pastoral (or lack of same) is completely independent of the economic actions of its authors. employees . . . . "IS B. Free Speech
Expertise
Secondly, the bishops are to be congratulated upon their refusal to bow down to demands that they impose restrictions on their right of free speech. Several reasons were presented to silence the bishops. One common criticism is that the bishops lack economic expertise." This argument is so compelling that even Robert McAfee Brown, an able defender of the bishops' pastoral, accepted it when he conceded that, apart from the fact that the bishops held hearings with experts in all parts of the country, it could be suggested that they were "venturing beyond their depth."I6 But this is nonsense. First of all, the argument from lack of expertise, like its colleague, the charge of hypocrisy, is an argumentum ad hominem, and therefore fallacious. T h e bishops may lack expertise, they may even be functionally illiterate, and yet the economy pastoral may still be correct in all its claims. T h e credentials of the authors are entirely irrelevant to the truth of their product, and this alone is our concern.
Further, it is by no means clear that the bishops lack expertise in economics. True, none of them have a Ph.D. in economics, but when did this become the criterion of expertise? There are numerous renowned economists-such as Adam Smith, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill in the days of yore, and Gordon 'I'ullock and David Friedman in the modern era-who cannot boast of an advanced degree in the discipline. Should we go to the ludicrous extreme of setting up a licensing authority, which would prohibit all but duly "qualified" persons from advancing their opinions on economic matters?" Then, too, there is the fact that the bishops' pastoral closely resembles the works of presumably "expert" economists, such as Robert Heilbroner, Robert Lekachman, and John Kenneth Galbraith. If these writers are economic experts, and the bishops' pastoral is comparable to their publications, on this criterion, w e must grant that the bishops have as much expertise as these other laborers in the vineyards of economics.
Trespass
Next, we consider the view that the bishops should hold their tongues because they do not have a "mandate" to speak out on economic issues. Peter L. Berger charges as follows: "A common assumption of democracy is that no one has a 'mandate' (prophetic or otherwise) to speak for people who have not elected him as their spokesman; the Catholic bishops o f t h e United States have not been elected by any constituency of poor people."" Lawler speaks of "trespass" in this regard: "The Catholic tradition involves a clear division of labor: bishops are to proclaim general moral principles; the political chore of enacting those principles falls to Catholic 
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laymen. So when the bishops endorse specific public policies, they are trespassing on the layman's territory."18 But the bishops have anticipated this objection. In their conclusion, they warn against a "spiritually schizophrenic existence" in which, in effect, people apply their moral and religious precepts on the Sabbath-but not during the rest of the week.lg Were the bishops to "stick to their knitting," e.g., confine themselves to discussing proper Sabbath behavior, they would only be exacerbating this unfortunate bifurcation.
If this is what the division of labor requires, then so much the worse for the division of labor.20
Harm
But the litany of irrelevant criticism has by no means been exhausted. There is also the widespread claim that the bishops' pastoral will do irreparable harm to this or that goal, and therefore never should have been written. Negative consequences include the "squandering of moral authority,"21 and "encouraging class conflict" or "divisiveness."22 With regard to the former, critics must realize that to the extent that the bishops' moral authority exists (and it is formidable in the United States, as evidenced by the attention devoted to the bishops' pastoral), it is the bishops' private property, to do
with as they wish. They earned it; they own it. If the higher Church authorities had so little confidence in the men who presently occupy the U.S. bishophric, as implied by this "friendly" criticism, the bishops presumably would be replaced."
23. I t may appear unseemly for a non-Catholic such as the present writer to presume to comment on the appropriateness of the U.S. bishops speaking out on economics. Protocol might indicate discreet silence as the best policy. But t o succumb t o this temptation would be t o violate a canon of social sc ieiicc: according t o which truth or falsity is the criterion of.judgment, arid the person or antecedents of t h e analyst a r e strictly irrelevant. An interesting interchange on this matter goes as follows:
Paul Heyne: I hope we can all agree that sociological criticisms of ideas a r e both useful and dangerous. 'I'hey a r e useful because ideas do have causes. And they a r e dangerous because such criticisms too easily degenerate into ignoring the validity of t h e ideas and concentrating on ad hominem attacks and assumed motives. I think this applies to both sides in the general discussion in which w e a r e engaged. IConsider I the propriety of criticizing Catholic popes and bishops for positions they take on economics or politics. It seems to m e that o n e ought t o ask oneself first, t o what audience a r e we talking when w e a r e talking about criticizing a pope o r a bishop or even a lowly Jesuit. (laughter) What is the audience? If it is t h e university audience, i f it is an academic audience, the presupposition is intellectual: the presumption is one of integrity a n d freedom. And the Catholic church, it seems t o me, historically, and indeed in practically any document in which this issue is discussed, has always taken t h e following position: that it is important a n d vital for people who disagree, whether they be within t h e church or Protestants, Jews, Muslims, whatever they may be, and this includes total non-believers, t o state fairly a n d correctly and as bluntly as they wish what their problems a r e with t h e position of t h e Catholic 
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But let us suppose for the moment that t h e critics' fears are well placed (as shall be argued below) a n d that the bishops' pastoral will tend to compromise the moral authority of the U.S. bishops. Would it really have been better if the bishops' pastoral had not been written? Given that the pastoral is an accurate portrayal of the bishops' thoughts (there is no reason to doubt this), is it not far better that their true thoughts o n these matters see the light of day, and be criticized in honest and open dialogue, rather than be suppressed out of fear? In other words, if the moral authority of the bishops is so reduced by the economy pastoral, is it not better, more open and honest (even from the point of view of their loyal opposition) that they lose this benefit, to which they are not entitled in any case? And with regard to the "harm" of divisiveness, Robert McAfee Brown offers two worthwhile responses. First, he points out, reasonably enough, "church unity can be bought at too high a Drice."
Second, he states, "truth emerges in the course" of c'reative ex~hange.''~'
Catholic Economies
Another presumed reason for the bishops to maintain a dignified silence on economic issues is the poor development record of "Catholic" nations. As Charles Krauthammer states, "Catholicism's historical record as a frame for economic development is not particularly encouraging. One has only to compare Protestant North America to Catholic South and Central America, o r Quebec (before it declericalized itself in the 1960's) to the rest of Canada, to make the point gently. N o one has yet accused the Catholic ethic of being a church, or with a given individual in t h e church. '1.0 do this, in my view, is not in any sense t o insult t h e dignity or t h e stature or t h e status o f t h e person or t h e author to whom you a r e addressing yourself. Now it is obviously possible, even for a professor, to be unfair and snide and bitter. W e know that happens. But in general, an honest man says, "I have read t h e position of the Catholic church," it seems t o me, a n d within the tradition of t h e intellectual integrity of which they ought to be obliged, o n e should SAY, "I appreciate very much t h e honour you do to us, to me, t o state what you hold a n d why you hold it." And in t h e context of academic freedom and intellectual integrity, o n e can respond t o that. If t h e premise is correct that t h e Catholic Church has a bad track record in this regard, that is all t h e m o r e reason t o tackle the subject matter a n d begin t o set things straight, so that errors will not be perpetuated. T h e bishops surely owe t h e faithful a t least that. T h e argument also assumes, curiously, that t h e church in so-called "Catholic nations" determines whether t h e economic system works efficiently. 
Motive Mongering
T h e last group of attacks on the bishops' letter attempts to account for the waywardness of this document in terms of special-and rather peculiar-motivations ascribed to its authors. The pastoral's great reliance on the state, in preference to the marketplace, allegedly springs from the fact that the Catholic Church is organized along hierarchical lines, the ones most conducive to and reminiscent of the public sector." Another "real" reason behind the creation of the bishops' pastoral is the fact that if its policy prescriptions are followed, that is, if the United States moves from capitalism to socialism, the bishops will have a greater role to play in society.28 T h e bishops' pastoral is also explained in terms of the monastic background of Archbishop Weakland.'" And, YOU had better be sitting down for this one, the bishops' pastoral has taken on a leftish tinge because the conference of bishops is located in Washington, D. One difficulty with all this motive-mongering is that it is exceedingly difficult to know whether the correct explanation has been reached. How, after all, would one determine whether or not the bishops' letter can best be understood as monasticism, or hierarchy writ large? T h e major problem, however, is that motivation is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the pastoral, which must be our main concern.
This section can best be concluded by two polar opposite views on the propriety of the bishops speaking out on economics. According to Archbishop Weakland, "the church's position [is] that no area of life is exempt from moral evaluation and judgment."" In contrast, von Geusau, a theologian from the Netherlands, claims, "Only in exceptional circumstances-such as the bishops of Poland encounter-should bishops address themselves to governments with policy recommendations."s2 Little accommodation is possible between these two statements. One pictures the church as an ostrich, with its head in the sand, the other as an eagle, soaring on high, unafraid to look at all beneath it. It is difficult to understand how such different visions could be urged upon the church by two of its sons.
C. Moral Indignation
T h e third positive element of the bishops' pastoral is its sense of outrage; the bishops are not cold and dispassionate in their treatment of the U.S. economy. There is injustice in the business world, there are victims in the economic sphere,3s and when these problems are recognized in the course of discussion, it is almost incumbent upon any analysis with a strong moral dimension to express at least a measure of indignation.
In this respect, the bishops' pastoral strongly contrasts to the Lay Commission's letter.3' If the former can be described as passionate or distressed, the latter can be called bloodless, analytical or even unfeeling. Such, at least, is the verdict rentute and hundreds of other organizations have managed to maintain a semblance of support for the marketplace, despite their location in that den of socialist iniquity, Washington, D.C.?
3 I . 32.
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Bush, supra note 6, at 248. Von Geusau, supra note 21, at 19. I t shall be argued below that the bishops have failed to understand the injustice which exists in the economy, and while they have correctly identified some of the victims, i.e., the poor, they have misconstrued the reason for making this claim.
34. Lay Letter, supra note 20. By contrast, t h e lay committee's letter c a n be regarded as somewhat speculative . . . .s6
D. Preferential Option for the Poor
T h e bishops are to be congratulated for making the welfare of the poor a bedrock of their moral and economic analysis. In doing so, they redirect public consciousness toward an examination of the causes and cures of poverty, and this can only be for the good. In future studies of society, thanks to the bishops' pastoral, it shall be exceedingly difficult to avoid the perspective of the last, least and lost amongst us; commentators shall be led, by the very visible hand of the bishops, t o ask of each proposed policy: What are its implications .~ f& the poor?
This doctrine, however, must not be misinterpreted. We must not conclude that justice can be fully satisfied by a fair treatment of the poor. Surely there is more to justice than And according to Donald Warwick, 'l'he letter, in my view, shows no great urgency about doing anything different. T h e lay letter does not seem to be really too worried about the extent of poverty, too worried about the extent of unemployment. It's concerned about the poor, but there is not a sense o f urgency in the letter. Indeed, I would argue that there is a sense o f complacency, that things are going along pretty well and w e shouldn't really do too much to upset too many apple carts too quickly. This is my interpretation. 1 may be wrong. If 1 am, I am sure Michael Novak will correct me. Four Views, supra note 14, at 1 1 1. Novak's reply to this statement contains no correction, so one can only deduce that even he agrees with the assessment made in the text. Novak only mentions this issue twice. First, he states "probably the most significant difference [between the lay letter and the bishops' pastoral] lies in the tone, attitude . . . of the two treatments." Secondly, he states that the bishops' letter begins in an "accusatory voice." Id. at 112. If anything, these utterances support Warwick's claim. 
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proper treatment for the poverty stricken.
T h e preferential option for the poor, properly interpreted, may be a necessary condition for justice, but it is hardly a sufficient In this regard, the statement of this option in the lay letter is preferable to that in the bishops' pastoral. According to the former, '(one measure of a good society is how well it cares for the weakest and most vulnerable of its members."" In the bishops' view, "the justice of a community is measured by its treatment of the powerless in society."'* Another caveat: We cannot interpret t h e preferential option for the poor as carte blanche for those with low incomes, vis-5-vis the wealthy. For example, only the opposite of justice is served if a person who inhabits territory south of the poverty line robs at gunpoint a rich but honest man.'@ Consider two other misstatements of this option: "The needs of the poor take priority over t h e desires of the rich,"'O and "this principle grants priority t o meeting fundamental human needs over the fulfillment of desires for luxury consumer goods or for profits that do not ultimately benefit real common good of the community."" Paul Heyne has quite properly criticized these misinterpretations as follows: "This is perilously close to pure demagoguery. Is the government supposed to call a halt to all skiing (surely a luxury) until everyone in the society is receiving a sound education (deemed a necessity by the bishops)? If it doesn't mean something like this, what does it mean . . .?""
E. Exploitation
One of the most magnificent aspects of the economy pas-36. Brown, supra note 12, at 129. It would appear that Brcwn has failed to give sufficient weight to this distraction. 
Luy Letter, s u p r a n o t e 20
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toral is its keen sense of awareness that the U.S. economy contains numerous instances of exploitation. Even more important, the bishops are cognizant of the fact that where there is economic injustice, there must be, and indeed are, perpetrators of such injustice! This insight is so profound, and the bishops are to be congratulated upon it even more, given that two of their main neo-conservative detractors not only missed it, but took great pains to distance themselves from it." Of course, the bishops have only touched the tip of the iceberg. In point of fact, there are literally hundreds of programs which subsidize, protect or regulate the rich and upper middle class to their benefit, and to the detriment of the more populous lower middle class and poor. "Corporate welfare bums" is a phrase that neatly summarizes the welter of bailouts, licensing arrangements, guarantees, restrictive entry provisions, tariffs and other protections, union legislation, and minimum wage laws which effectively transfer vast sums of money from the threadbare pockets of the poor to the ermine-wrapped coffers of the rich and relatively well-to-do.
But Michael Novak, for one, is having none of this. In his view, t h e bishops' use of the term "marginalization" suggests a deliberate policy-people being driven to the margins; or at least an intention to keep people visible or out of sight.44 "Correlatively, in speaking of the poor, the draft tends to look at the poor as passive victims . . , ."46 He continues, "But the implied image [in the bishops' pastoral] of the economy is that of a . . . managed economy, whose 'priorities' are set by experts standing outside the system and directing it consciously from above."46
Contrary to the claim of Novak, however, these views of the bishops are all correct. Anyone who seriously contends that the poor are not "held back" and "done to" has somehow failed to take into account the work of numerous econo- Heyne has elsewhere found that unemployment can be reduced by direct action (by repealing the minimum wage law), which is as deliberate as adjusting a thermostat." Novak and Heyne make two claims against the bishops. First, the poor are not helpless, or victimized, or compelled by more powerful forces. This, we have seen, must be rejected, based on evidence supplied not only by the economic profession in general, but also by the individual contributions of Novak and Heyne. Their second claim, however, is more difficult to refute. Here, Novak and Heyne deny the charge of the bishops that the destruction visited on the poor by and through government is "intended," "goal-directed," "faultworthy," "deliberate," "consciously directed" and constitutes "positive oppression ."
This claim cannot be rejected so easily; neo-classical economics deals mainly with results of human action, not with the internal mind-states of the perpetrators.61 T h e issue is a matter of common sense, and here the bishops have it all over their two critics. Let us stipulate, for the sake of argument, that minimum wage laws raise the unemployment rates of teenage black males to astronomical levels, that union legislation discriminates against the downtrodden, that Chryslertype bailouts benefit the rich at the expense of the poor, that tariffs and other trade interferences victimize those at the bottom of the economic pyramid, and that taxi licensing laws freeze the poor out of ownership positions. Can one seriously contend that all the professional economists and lawyers who nevertheless advocate such policies, the bureaucrats who administer them, and the politicians who enact them, do so in blissful ignorance of their effects? If not, there is at least one person in the United States who intends to harm the poor, and presumably many more. In any case, if economics must remain forever silent on the question of motivation, how is it that Novak and Heyne are so sure that none of these depredations on the poor are "directed," or "deliberate?" 'These two critics speak as if the U.S. economy were presently one of laissez-faire capitalism. If, and only if, there were a full free market in operation, their claims would be true; 
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F . How Natural is Wealth?
Another incisive point made in the economy pastoral concerns the question of how natural-or artificial-is wealth. T h e bishops take the view that, in the absence of any barriers to the contrary, the natural lot of mankind is one of prosperity.
Michael Novak castigates the bishops for this position:
[Tlhe bishops speak . . . as if wealth were the natural condition of human beings . . . . The point of view of the lay letter, by contrast, is that poverty is a common initial condition in human history, and that to create wealth, new causes such as investment, creativity, and entrepreneurship must be put into operation."
T h e answer to this dispute will of course depend on how to precisely define the natural state of affairs. In order to put the Novak hypothesis in a reasonable light, "nature" must be defined in terms of a full free enterprise system, that is, where n o prohibitions of any kind over "capitalist acts between consenting adult^"^' shall be implemented. Under such conditions, what is the likely prosperity level of a group of people lacking all semblance of business sense, economic creativity, investment funds, or entrepreneurship? And the obvious answer is, very high, thank you.
Thanks to the "magic of the m a r k e t p l a~e , "~~ such people do very well, even in America, a land which only very imperfectly approaches a free marketplace. There are millions of lower and middle class Americans whose standard of living is [Vol. 2 the envy of the rest of the world, yet who have no funds invested in business, display little creativity in the economic sense, and have no personal acquaintance whatever with the entrepreneurial spirit. To be sure, the qualities mentioned by Novak are also important. But it is necessary only that a minority of people have them, and this requirement has been met in virtually every society known to man. T h e bottleneck is not entrepreneurship, but rather absence of totalitarian government which perverts, distorts and grinds down man's natural inclination toward prosperity and wealth.
G. Dialogue
T h e bishops call for dialogue on the economic and moral questions which face us today. This is most welcome. It is by airing these issues-under the unique perspective offered to us in the bishops' pastoral-that progress can be made.
T h e process already seems to be bearing fruit in terms of promoting discussion." An immense critical literature has sprung up in the short time since the first draft of the letter. T h e consultative procedure which will take place before the final draft is published will encourage even more reflection.
Donald Warwick, consultant to the bishops' committee, expresses himself in this matter as follows: H. Immorality of Unemployment One can read numerous economic treatises without ever once coming across a claim that unemployment is immoral. Perhaps this is as it should be, given the division of labor which restricts the dismal science from normative concerns. Nevertheless, it is like a breath of fresh air to be told in blunt terms that "current levels of unemployment are morally un i us t i fied . ' ' '3 . , Thanks to the U.S. bishops, we shall henceforth see not only the economic, sociological and psychological tragedies of unemployment, but we shall be able to view this phenomenon through a moral perspective as well.
There is a fly in the ointment, however. It is one thing to condemn present unemployment rates as immoral, and to describe a rate of six to seven percent as ''unacceptable,"eo but it is quite another matter to award a passing ethical grade to unemployment at the three to four percent level.61 At what point does unemployment pass from "morally unjustified" to morally acceptable? Thus, the bishops' claim appears to be rather arbitrary.
A more appropriate analytical device might be to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. How can such a distinction be made? An employment contract is nothing but a specific type of trade: one in which the employee gives up leisure and obtains money, and the employer pays the money and receives labor services in return. Involuntary or coercive unemployment, then, is the result of any barrier, such as the threat or actual use of force, that prevents the consummation of an employment agreement. Examples include the minimum wage law, labor legislation which physically prevents the employer from hiring a strike breaker ("scab"), or union violence to that same end, as well as taxi and trucking enactments which prohibit contracts for employment. Voluntary unemployment, on the other hand, consists of joblessness in the absence of such constraints. For example, a person may be looking for a job (frictional unemployment), or holding out for a higher salary than presently offered, or taking an extended vacation. With this characterization in mind, we can more readily distinguish between that unemployment which is morally justified, and that which is not: any coercive unemployment is immoral, no matter how low, and any voluntary unemployment, no matter how high, even up to lOOO/c of the labor force. is morally acceptable.
I . Overpopulation
T h e last point upon which to congratulate the bishops pertains to their refusal to be stampeded by the over-populationists, the Malthusians of the day,"2 into a call for birth control, whether by abortioneS or not, in order to promote economic development.
It has been shown time and time again that there is very little statistical correlation, or causal relation, between dense or high population and poverty. True, India is poor and highly populated, while Kuwait is rich and underpopulated.
O n the other hand, there are numerous examples of the opposite taking place. For example, there are the "teeming masses" jammed, sardine-like, into their luxurious dwellings in Manhattan, Paris, Rome, London, Tokyo and San Francisco. Alternatively, there are countries where nary a person can ever be seen-which nonetheless wallow in dire poverty."' 62.
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See Greeley, supra note 8, at 36; Special Report, supra note 14, at 
PHILOSOPHY: POSITIVE ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Having noted and duly expounded upon the praiseworthy elements of the bishops' pastoral, this section considers the errors committed by the authors of this document. T h e bishops have committed many and serious mistakes of cornmission and omission, of fact and value, of philosophy and economics. To prevent any, misinterpretation, however, it must be said that none of these lapses from logic justify a demand that the bishops remain silent. Whose work, after all, is error free . . . on this side of the Garden of Eden? This section begins with the bishops' defense of the doctrine of positive economic rights.
I t is no exaggeration to say that positive economic "rights" form one of the basic building blocks of the bishops' entire philosophy. T h e adherence to this position appears early in the bishops' pastoral, is repeated on numerous occasions, comprises the mainstay of Section 11, Ethical Norms for Economic Life, and informs much of the discussion in Part Two, which is devoted to public policy recommendations. For example, the bishops demand that [Tlhe nation must take up the task of framing a new national consensus that all persons have rights in the economic sphere and that society has a moral obligation to take the necessary steps to ensure that n o one among us is hungry, homeless, unemployed, or otherwise denied what is necessary to live with dignity."6 Several of the bishops' supporters have carried this one step further, explicitly calling for a new "Economic Bill of Rights," to supplement that which is already part of the U.S. Constitution."" This concept, however, is deeply flawed, and even mischievous, as demonstrated by a comparison of the traditional view of negative rights with the newer variety urged by the bishops.
In classical philosophy, negative rights or negative liberty shelter, and, depending on which variant is under discussion, to a reasonable lifestyle, to non-discriminatory behavior, to meaningful relationships, to psychological well-being, to employment, and to a decent wage. One basic problem with so-called positive "rights" is that they are not really rights at all. Rather, they are aspects of wealth, or power, or control over the environment. T o illustrate the stark differences between the t w o very dissimilar concepts of rights, they will be contrasted in several dimensions.
A. Environmental Dependency
Negative rights are independent of time, space, location and condition. They apply right now, but they were just as appropriate and pertinent ten thousand years ago. They are completely independent of circumstances. It was a rights violation for one caveman to club another over the head in prehistoric times; this will hold true for spacemen ten thousand years in the future.
In contrast, positive "rights" are highly environmentally dependent. If people have a positive "right" to food, there must be food available, otherwise they will be deprived of their rights. And this may be impossible in certain eras (during the seven "lean years" of the Bible), climates (the Arctic), or locations (the Sahara). Comparatively, for negative rights to be respected, people must only refrain from initiatory violence.
B. Good Will
Only an act of will on the part of all people is necessary for negative rights to be entrenched. If the earth's entire population suddenly resolved never again to engage in the first use of force, all negative rights violations would come to an end, in one fell swoop.
But this is not the case with positive rights. We may all be of the best will in the world, and yet not succeed in delivering the goods and services required to satisfy all positive human "rights" for the entire population of the world. 
C . Alteration
Negative rights are unchanging. They have always been precisely the same as they are right now and will always remain so. Positive "rights" are subject to change, depending upon t h e never stable definition of "decency" o r "minimum standards." People began to have "rights" to indoor plumbing, varieties in food, refrigerators, and television sets only after they became available. They have always had the right not to be the target of aggression.
D. Agency
Only another human being can violate negative rights-by launching force against an innocent person. Both humans and nature, however, can violate positive "rights."
People can do so, of course, by refusing to give of themselves and their property that which is due to others according to this doctrine. But nature can continue to undermine positive "rights" as well. Storms, floods, frosts, avalanches, volcanoes, meteors, fires, and other acts of God can deprive people of the satisfaction of their positive "rights." None of these tragedies are even relevant to negative rights.
E. Game Theory
Negative rights are reminiscent of a positive sum game, in that if one person suddenly attains an increase in his negative rights (fewer people for some reason aggress against him, or do so to a lesser degree) there need not necessarily be a diminution in the negative rights enjoyed by anyone else." T h e economic analogue of the positive sum game is trade, where both parties to a commercial arrangement gain at least in the ex ante sense-otherwise they would not have agreed to participate. T h e paradigm case of the zero sum game is poker. Here, unless there is something very strange indeed going on, the winnings and losings of the various players must exactly cancel out one another. Hence, the zero sum game-which is evocative of positive "rights." Thus, if one person's rights to clothing or shelter, for example, are enhanced, then those of some other people are necessarily reduced by the same amount.e8
F. Charity
Under a regime of positive "rights," it is not merely difficult t o give charity to the poor, it is logically impossible. Even if the donor. intends that his offering be charitable, it cannot be. If this philosophy of the bishops' pastoral is correct, the poor recipient has a right to (part of) the wealth of the rich person who, in turn, has an obligation to hand it over.
'I'he relation between donor and recipient can no longer be one of giver and receiver of charity. T h e poor recipient now approaches the rich donor not in the stance of making a request, but with the demeanor of a bill collector who is settling a debt. If the rich man refuses to make the payment, the poor one need not plead with him, as for alms; now, armed with positive "rights," he can demand that the wealthy person fulfill his "obligation." In contrast, if only negative rights are operational, then charity is logically legitimate-as common sense indicates it to be.
T h e bishops cannot have it both ways. They can purchase positive "rights," but only at the cost of charity. But if they opt for the latter, they can no longer ask for tithes-they must present bills.
G . Occam's Razor
Several perfectly good phrases convey what positive "rights" are meant to communicate: wealth, power, riches. T h e additional and complex terminology of positive "rights" only serves to confuse matters. T h e scientific laws of parsimony known under the rubric "Occam's Razor" are sufficient t o rule this out of court.8e 68. Notc that police protection, even though primarily used to enhance negative rights. is itself a resource, an aspect of wealth, and thus an instance of positive "rights." If one person has been accorded more police protection, another person must be given less.
Behind the use of positive "rights," of course, is the attempt to 69.
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H. Incumbency
Who is responsible for carrying out the obligations imposed on people by the t w o alternative views under consideration? With negative rights, the answer is clear: everyone must refrain from engaging in physical coercion. There are no exceptions.
Matters are far less clear with positive "rights." Who must share their wealth with the less fortunate-people in the same nation? Do those in the same state, city, county or borough have an obligation to share?
One answer is that everyone is obligated to share with those who are less fortunate. But this is a truly radical idea, and would empower foreigners to present themselves at our shores and not simply request that we divide our wealth with them, but demand it.
I. Degree
T h e degree to which these rights must be respected is yet another dimension upon which the two doctrines widely diverge. In the case of real rights (i.e., negative rights-which is a redundancy), absolute compliance is required. One is forbidden to physically aggress against other people even ~lightly.~' One cannot touch even "a hair on their heads."71 But this has no implication for the distribution of income, because it is irrelevant to the concerns of negative rights.
What about the case of positive rights? How far must the redistribution process go? We are never vouchsafed an answer in the bishops' pastoral; thus, we can only speculate. T h e only philosophically satisfactory answer to this question wrest trom the concept of rights some of its luster, and apply it to the otherwise less savory policy o f coercively transferring income from rich to poor.
Why is only physical aggression proscribed? Why not psychological damage, o r "mental cruelty?" T h e short answer is that violations o f law prohibiting physical coercion deserve jail sentences: people who engage in psychological "evasiveness," or meanness, are typically guilty of no more than the exercise of their (negative) rights of free speech in ways to which someone objects. For an account of the dividing line between aggression and non-aggression, and for an explication of the natural rights phiiosophy, see R. NOZICK, supra note 54; M. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1 982).
For an analysis of how rights philosophy is applied to matters of ecology, environmentalism and external diseconomies, see Rothbard, Law, Property Rights and Air Pollution, 2 CAIO J. 55 (1 982).
70.
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is that the process must continue until absolute income/ wealth equality has been achieved.72 If the reason for the process itself is inequality, then as long as any vestige of inequality remains, continuation of the process would appear to be j~s t i f i e d . ?~
J. Government
T h e implications for the scope of government in the two alternative rights philosophies are also very different. Novak's views on this question are definitive:
T h e concept of economic rights undermines the American idea of the limited state. Civil and political rights prevent the state from blocking God-given, inalienable rights. But economic rights empower the state to take positive actions, including the establishment of definitions, conditions, and procedures which beneficiaries must meet, and the seizing of powers over the economy necessary to meet them. This logically takes the form (in China) of population controls; (in the USSR) of mandatory displacement of the unemployed to employment as the state directs (in Siberia, e.g.);
and (in Poland) of control over political life by control over all employment. Economic rights inevitably increase t h e power of the ~t a t e .~' In contrast, negative rights contemplate a very limited government. Indeed, the classical liberals saw the protection of (negative) liberties as the main and most important function of their "night watchman" state.
K. Punishment
Violators of (negative) rights are commonly punished by the imposition of fines and, for serious offenses, by jail sentences or even the death penalty. An entire literature ex-
72.
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See Levin, Negative Liberty, 2 Soc:. Ptiii. & Poi.% 84 (1984). 'l'he logic of the view put forth in the bishops' pastoral implies a "Brave New World" type of horror as well, given only the availability of the appropriate technology. Suppose there were machines which could transfer intelligence, or beauty, or serenity, or happiness, or even religious appreciation from one person to another. I f those w h o are "rich" in these attributes really have an obligation to share with the less fortunate, they must be grabbed, kicking and screaming if need be, and forced to enter these personality-redistributing machines, n o matter how personally shattering the experience might be.
74. Novak, supra note 22, at 9.
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ists on the tailoring of punishments to fit the particular crime.76 N o such thing exists, to say the least, in the case of positive "rights" violations. Indeed, the whole idea is abhorrent. T h e idea of punishing people for not living up to these socalled obligations is repugnant (especially when it is unclear which specific rich individuals are responsible for giving sustenance to which particular poor p e~p l e ) .~' And yet the concoction of such a theory is a necessary condition for making any sense out of the doctrine of positive "rights." This failure sheds doubt on whether its proponents take their own theory seriously.
L. Rights Conjicts
Two different rights can only conflict in the case of positive "rights." Here, one person's boundaries can extend well into those of another. And when rights overlap, there is conflict-and one, the other, o r both of the "rights" must be abrogated.
In the case mentioned by the bishops, the "rights" of third world countries to export their goods to the United States are incompatible with the "rights" of domestic workers to keep their jobs and produce the items at a higher One cannot possibly respect both sets of positive "rights." This leads to the conclusion that one, the other, or both may not be rights at all.
In contrast, there is no such possibility of conflict in the realm of negative rights. T h e right of A not to be a target of aggression cannot conflict with the identical right of B.
M, Egalitarianism
Given the presumption of equality in the area of rights (we all have equal rights before the law), the recognition of positive rights leads ineluctably to egalitarianism. If we all I t will do n o good to reply that government, through the tax and welfare system, should organize matters so that our positive "rights" obligations are met. For rights violations are an individual matter: specific, individual people presumably should be penalized if they fail to meet their responsibilities. 
See
75.
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(Vol. 2 have equal positive "rights," and positive "rights" are simply synonyms for wealth, then income equality is justified. Needless to say, no such presumption of egalitarianism applies t o negative rights. T o be sure, we all have an equal right not to be coerced, but since this has nothing to do with wealth, egalitarianism cannot be deduced from such a system. I n summary, the two concepts of rights are quite different. There is of course no law against couching a demand for wealth redistribution in "rights" language, but this does confuse matters. We can say if we wish that positive "rights" are rights, but w e must keep in mind that the t w o versions of rights are greatly at odds with one another; thus this usage can only spread confusion.
ECONOMICS
In Part Two of the bishops' pastoral, the section devoted to policy applications, the bishops address themselves to numerous issues of economics. This commentary shall deal with employment, poverty and economic justice.
A. Unions
It is not difficult to document the fact that the bishops' pastoral champions unionism as commonly practiced in the United States. Indeed, the sections of the letter dealing with this "curious institution" are virtually nothing but paeans of praise.78 T h e bishops go so far as to invite unions to organize their own ernployee~.'~ If anything, however, the lay letter is even more vociferous in its flattery of the U.S. union movement. It exults in the fact that the Catholic church has been a long-time and faithful supporter," a dubious distinction indeed.
78.
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Pastoral Letter, supra note I , paras. 1 1 1-14 T h e bishops' major reason for their support of American unionism is that "employers frequently possess greater bargaining power than do employees in the negotiation of wage agreements. Such unequal power may press workers into a choice between an inadequate wage and no wage at But this rather seriously misconstrues the process of wage determination. In a free labor market, wages are basically set by the marginal revenue productivitys2 of the employee-not on the basis of bargaining power, scale of enterprises, or size of labor units. If bargaining power correctly explained wage rates, remuneration would be negatively correlated with the concentration ratio; that is, industries with fewer employees would pay lower wages than ones with many-and wages would be unrelated to measures of productivity such as educational attainment. Needless to say, no evidence for this contention exists.
T h e lay letter also articulates "full support for the principle of free and voluntary association in labor unions."ss But this is disingenuous. It is not even a rough approximation of how organized labor has and still continues to operate in the United States. There are t w o kinds of unions possible. First, there are those which do all that they can to raise their members' wages and working conditions-except violate the (negative) rights of other people by initiating violence against them. These can be called "voluntary unions." Second are those unions which do all that they can to promote their members' welfare-up to and including the use of physical brutality aimed at non-aggressing individuals.
With regard to the activity of coercive unions as defined above, Ludwig von Mises has stated:
In all countries the labor unions have actually acquired the privilege of violent action. T h e governments have abandoned in their favor the essential attribute of government, the exclusive power and right to resort to violent coercion and compulsion. Of course, the laws which make it a criminal offense for any citizen to resort-except in case of self-8 I .
82.
Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. concerning wage rates a n d o t h e r labor conditions. T h e y a r e free t o inflict with impunity bodily evils upon strikebreakers and upon entrepreneurs a n d mandataries o f entrepreneurs who employ strike breakers. T h e y are free t o destroy property of such employers a n d even t o injure customers patronizing their shops. T h e authorities, with t h e approval of public opinion, condone such acts. T h e police do not stop such offenders, t h e state attorneys do not arraign them, a n d n o opportunity is offered t o t h e penal courts t o pass judgment o n their actions. In excessive cases, if t h e deeds o f violence go t o o far, some lame a n d timid attempts a t repression a n d prevention a r e ventured. But as a rule they fail. Neither is it correct to look upon the matter from the point of view of a "right t o strike." l'he problem is not the right t o strike, but t h e right-by intimidation or violence-to force other people t o strike, and the further right to prevent anybody from working in a shop in which a union has called a strike. When the unions invoke the right to strike in ,justification of such intimidation and deeds of violence, they are on no better ground than a religious group would be in invoking the right of freedom of conscience as a justification o f persecuting dissenters.
T h e i r failure is sometimes d u e t o bureaucratic inefficiency o r t o t h e insufficiency of t h e means a t t h e disposal of t h e authorities, but m o r e often it is d u e t o t h e unwillingness of
When in the past the laws of some countries denied to employees the right to form unions, they were guided by the idea that
I53
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In the view of Friedrich Hayek:
It cannot be stressed e n o u g h that t h e coercion which unions have been permitted t o exercise contrary to all principles o f freedom u n d e r t h e law is primarily the coercion of fellow workers. Whatever t r u e coercive p o w e r unions may be able t o wield over employers is a consequence o f this primary power o f coercing o t h e r workers; t h e coercion o f e mployers would lose most of its objectionable c h a r a c t e r if unions were deprived o f this power t o exact unwilling support. Neither t h e right o f voluntary agreement between workers n o r even their right t o withhold their services in concert is in question.86
Coercive union violence in the United States (and other countries) is directed at the innocent people at the bottom of the employment ladder, the least, last, and lost of us. T h e bishops, in their principle of the preferential option for the poor, ask us to take particular concern for the welfare of these individuals. These individuals are, in a word, the "scabs."
Now scabs have received very bad press. Even the appellation ascribed to them is one of derogation. But when all the loose and inaccurate verbiage is stripped away, the scab is no more than a poor person, often unskilled, uneducated, unemployed, perhaps a member of a minority group, who seeks only to enter the labor market," and there to offer his sersuch unions had no objective other than to resort to violent action and intimidation. When the authorities in the past sometimes directed their armed forces to protect the employers, their mandataries, and their property against the onslaught of strikers, they were not guilty of acts hostile to "labor." They simply did what every government considers its main duty. They tried to preserve their exclusive right to resort to violent action. Id 50 (1984) . I t is sometimes alleged that the union is justified in visiting violence upon the scab, since the scab initiates coercion by daring to "steal" the.job "owned" by the organized worker in the first place. But this claim cannot withstand analysis. T h e employed worker no more owns "his" job than does the outsider. An employment contrayt is simply a contract between t w o willing parties; neither party can own it. In a free society, a soci-8 5 .
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vices to t h e highest bidder. In fact, it is no exaggeration to consider the scab the economic equivalent of the leper. And w e all know the treatment of lepers urged upon us by ecclesiastical and biblical authorities."
In their excessively pro (coercive) union stance, the authors of both the bishops' pastoral and the lay letter expose themselves as untrue to the morally axiomatic principle of the preferential option of the poor. T h e "poor," in this case, are not the princes of labor, organized into gigantic, powerful and coercive unions. Kather, they are the despised, downtrodden and denigrated scabs. But if "poor" in this case is interpreted as referring to coercively unionized workers, not scabs, then t h e principle of the preferential option for the poor is being seriously misinterpreted.
This commentary does not argue against the legitimacy of voluntary unions, those which restrict themselves to mass walkouts and other non-invasive activity. T h e only difficulty is that in modern day America, there are no such entities.
B . Wages
T h e muddied waters of wage theory into which the bishops have launched themselves will now be considered. On several occasions, scattered throughout the pastoral letter, they put themselves on record as calling for 'Ijust wages,"" or "adequate r e m u n e r a t i~n . "~~ One of the greatest intellectual tragedies of the Church, one from which religious institutions are only now beginning to recover, is the medieval debate concerning the "just price." Evocative of questions such as "how many angels can dance on the tip of a pin," the 'Ijust price" controversy is well o n the way toward being resolved. And the answer? T h e just price for an item is any payment agreed upon by any pair of buyers and sellers. Now that the ''just price" wars have been happily consigned to the dustbin of history, a fate they so richly deserve, another equally trivial contention has come along to again threaten the intellectual probity of ecclesiastical organizations, this one over ''just wages." Hopefully, this will soon go the way of the other, and we shall be left with the similar result that the just wage is any level of remuneration mutually acceptable to an employer and employee.
But this, unfortunately, will have to overcome the contrary efforts of the bishops. In their view, "Labor is not simply a commodity traded on the open market nor is a just wage determined simply by the level the market will sustain.
This will not do, however. To be sure, labor is not simply a commodity like any other. For one thing, it cannot legally be traded, only rented. T h e question is, what reason do the bishops put forth to justify their contention that a just wage is not that reached on the open market? T h e answer is, none. Thus, the epistemological status of labor is a red herring. Given that labor is not a commodity like others, we still have no case against considering the market wage as the just wage. Another problem is the bishops' failure to precisely define the just wage. They only assert what it is not, namely the market wage-the one agreed upon by two consenting parties. Yet it is obligatory upon the bishops, because they are putting forth a claim, to elucidate what it is, not what it is not.
Let us assert, for the sake of argument, that the just wage is always 120% of the market wage. That is, all workers are presently being exploited to the tune of twenty percent oftheir wages. Do not cavil at the arbitrariness of any such proposal; instead, consider this more a fundamental objection to any specification of the just wage (apart from the market wage, whatever it is). Suppose that someone willingly, happily and voluntarily wants to work for less than the 'Ijust wage." Suppose, that is, that a church employee wants to make a contribution to his employer, in effect, in the form of a salary cut. One writer plaintively asks, "whether the dedication of Christians who work for less than a 'just wage' is now to be deemed immoral. That would be a not-so-delicate break from the Christian his-90. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 110. See Second Draft, supra note 1 1, para. 102.
